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I. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. TRADE SECRETS AND DEPARTING EMPLOYEES
ARDLY a day goes by without at least one new suit being filed
alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, typically from a for-
mer employer. Many of these suits follow a familiar pattern, fo-
cusing on what the former employer claims are its trade secrets and
including many related causes of action. Several recent cases provide an
instructive and useful contrast-sometimes amounting to roadmaps of
what an employee should not do when preparing to open her own com-
peting enterprise and other times illustrating what may lawfully be done
in fair and proper competition.
In Pearson v. Visual Innovations Co.,' it would appear that before Mr.
Pearson resigned his employment, he aggressively prepared to compete
with it. While still employed by his former employer, he had "numerous"
conversations with two major clients about transferring their business and
received "verbal assurances" that they would do so; he negotiated con-
tracts with them based on his former relationship and dealings with them;
1. No. 03-04-00563-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2795 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 6,
2006, pet. denied).
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and, once his new entity was in operation, he received all of its revenue
from former clients of his former employer.2 Before he resigned, he also
downloaded copies of many files from his former employer, deleted them
from his company computer, and saved them on his home computer. It
was alleged he also deleted client records and "thousands" of emails, and
destroyed the signed original noncompetition covenants of several em-
ployees, including some who went to work for him. It was also alleged
that he took equipment with him, though what equipment he took was
not specified. 3
In these circumstances an injunction was issued, but Pearson's appeal
of it was mooted by the time of the appeal because the injunction had
already expired. 4 Pearson's appeal was focused entirely on the validity of
his noncompetition covenant. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the
noncompetition covenant was valid. Consequently Mr. Pearson's objec-
tions as to the trial court's judgment finding him liable for fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interfer-
ence were waived, and the judgment was affirmed. 5
RenewData Corp. v. Strickler6 provided more illustrative examples but
in a markedly different context. In this case, the allegedly wrongful acts
appear to have occurred after the former employee left, rather than
before. Here, Strickler was director of corporate sales services. He was
subject to covenants regarding noncompetition, confidentiality, non-solic-
itation of the former employer's clients for one year, and a commitment
to return the former employer's company documents. He was terminated
on a Friday. On the following Monday, he e-mailed one of his former
employer's competitors, asking to discuss job opportunities. A week later
he called his former supervisor and asked if it "minded" if he went to
work for one of his unspecified partners, but the former supervisor did
not commit. Strickler and the competitor made an agreement, and he
wrote his former employer, letting him know that he had accepted this
new position and would begin work shortly afterward. 7
On Strickler's first day in his new position, his new employer advised
him to seek legal advice as to his relationship with his former employer
and his new job but also asked him to document his goals and say "who
the immediate easy money targets are."'8 The new company made clear
that its goal was for Strickler to bring in "NEW business" (emphasis in
original), and admitted that it did not specifically do anything to make
2. Id. at *4.
3. Id. at*5-6.
4. Id. at *9 (citing NCAA v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) ("when injunction
becomes inoperative due to passage of time, issue of its validity becomes moot, and appel-
late court decision about injunction's validity under such circumstances would constitute
impermissible advisory opinion")).
5. Id. at *22-23.
6. No. 03-05-00273-CV, 2006 WL 504998 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 3, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
7. Id. at *1-2.
8. Id. at *3.
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sure Strickler was not contacting customers who had been customers of
his former employer. 9 The facts were less distinct or direct than is often
the case, but there was evidence in the form of an e-mail that Strickler
knew enough about his former employer's pricing to characterize a par-
ticular bid of his former employer as "playing dirty."'10 The email also
characterized Strickler's efforts to draw clients from his former employer
as "subtly pointing out"'" things his new employer could do that his for-
mer employer could not. Strickler also knew enough about the former
employer to specifically address pricing adjustments.12 From these facts,
the Austin Court of Appeals concluded there was more than a scintilla of
evidence supporting a finding that Strickler disclosed proprietary infor-
mation and affirmed the jury's verdict in that regard.13
Strickler apparently sent one or more e-mails to companies with whom
he had worked while with his former employer, and one did follow him,
leading to a $2,500 commission for Strickler.14 There was also evidence
that Strickler had a company document, which he characterized as a For-
tune 1000 list in his personal e-mail, but Strickler did not search his e-mail
until he responded to requests for production. The court of appeals held
that this was a breach of his contractual obligation to return company
documents upon departure, even if he did not remember that he had
them.15
Strickler argued his actions were merely "healthy competition," 16 and
certainly many cases present more compelling proof of liability. But the
court of appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence of "wrongful
act[s]" to support the judgment, including Strickler's
plan to share his knowledge of [his former employer's] business and
technology ... ,failure to return a document belonging to [his for-
mer employer] when he left .... an e-mail to his former client "en-
couraging a call to assist with its 'opportunities,"' "subtly pointing
out" to [a client] things his new employer could offer that [his former
employer] could not, lack of elaboration to [his new employer] about
what particular information he was sharing, authorization to "play
around with" a spreadsheet for [his new employer's] re-bidding pur-
poses, inclusion in a meeting on pricing adjustments to [the new cli-
ent's project], and descri[bing his former employer's] business
conduct as 'playing dirty."17
Conflicting evidence led to a different result in Dallas Anesthesiology
Associates, P.A. v. Texas Anesthesia Group, P.A.1 8 There, a former em-
9. Id. at *8.
10. Id. at *15.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *3.
15. Id. at *9.
16. Id. at *15.
17. Id.
18. 190 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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ployer alleged that certain doctors had misappropriated confidential in-
formation, tortiously interfered with business relationships, and tortiously
interfered with other employees' duties of loyalty when they left to start
their own practice. The trial court initially granted a temporary re-
straining order against the departing employee-physicians but later modi-
fied it. The trial court then dissolved the modified order and refused to
grant a temporary injunction.t 9
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that in view of the conflicting evi-
dence and the fact that there was some evidence to support the trial
court's decision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
issue a temporary injunction. 20 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's order.21 To support its decision, the court of appeals noted the
presence of some defensive evidence: the fact that only patient informa-
tion was marked confidential, as opposed to the documents which were
circulated at meetings and not retrieved when the meetings ended; when
recruiting other doctors, the former employer did not ask the recruits to
sign confidentiality agreements and freely shared information relating to
the surgeons they worked with, whom they preferred, their most impor-
tant clients, and annual revenues and income; and when the departing
doctors left, they were not asked to return confidential information. 22
B. CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSES: NOT A BREACH
TO SAY WHO WANTED IT?
Many contracts, specifically in settlement agreements, include "confi-
dentiality" provisions that address the parties' intent to keep aspects of
their agreement confidential. Christenberry v. Webber 23 presented the in-
teresting issue of whether the identity of the party that proposed (or in-
sisted on) including the confidentiality provision in an agreement may
itself be confidential.
In the circumstances of this case, the Houston Court of Appeals for the
First District held that the agreement indicated that the identity of the
party who wanted the terms kept confidential could be disclosed. 24 Ac-
cordingly, it was not a breach of the settlement agreement to reveal which
party wanted the substantive terms to be kept confidential. 25
Of course, if such information about the negotiations leading up to the
final agreement is not included within the terms of a confidentiality provi-
sion, it may be reasonable to ask what else about the negotiations-such
as why a party wanted certain terms or topics kept confidential, or how
19. Id. at 893-94.
20. Id. at 898.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 897.
23. No. 01-04-00109-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1142 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2006, no pet.).
24. Id. at *19.
25. Id. at *20.
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urgently the party wanted it-may also be revealed without breach. Con-
fidentiality agreements should be considered with this in mind.
C. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT:
A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act26 criminalizes fraud and abuse
that occurs using computers. But it also authorizes private, civil actions
for some, though not all, violations of its provisions. In Fiber Systems
International, Inc. v. Roehrs,27 the Fifth Circuit defined what must be re-
quired to be shown in order to trigger civil liability.
The substantive provision at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)( 4), which
"prohibits the 'knowing [ . . . ]access [of] a protected computer without
authorization,' with intent to defraud, if 'such conduct furthers the in-
tended fraud and [the violator] obtains anything of value." 28 Section
1030(g) of the act provides that "any person who suffers damage or loss
by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against
the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or
other equitable relief," but it further requires that "[a] civil action for
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves [one]
of the factors set forth in" at least one of clauses (i) through (v) of
§ 1030(a)( 5)( B). 2 9 Those factors are
(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period ... ] aggregat-
ing at least $5,000 in value; (ii) [impairment of] medical examination,
diagnosis, [or] treatment [... ]; (iii) [physical injury]; (iv) [threat to
public health or safety]; or (v) [damage to a computer system used by
the government for the] administration of justice, national defense,
or national security. 30
Here, the jury found the defendant had violated section 1030(a)( 4).31
The Fifth Circuit found that this violation, when combined with one or
more of the factors set out in Section 1030(a)( 5)( B)( i)-( v), was enough
to support civil liability.32 The jury also found that the plaintiff falsely
accused the defendants of being "thieves," however, so the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the "value" the defendants must have obtained unlawfully
could not have been stolen trade secrets.33
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2007).
27. 470 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir. 2006).
28. Id. at 1156 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)( 4)).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)( 5)( B)( i)-( v).
31. Fiber Sys. Int'l, 470 F.3d at 1159.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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II. BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT AND
PERSONAL DEFAMATION
A. INADEQUATE INVESTIGATION AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE
Physicians who receive unfavorable peer reviews and are then denied
staff privileges at hospitals face an aphill struggle to establish tortious
interference or defamation claims.34 Particularly, under Section 160.010
of the Texas Occupations Code, healthcare entities and medical peer re-
view committee members are immune from liability so long as they act
without malice.35 "Malice" is defined as "the specific intent ... to cause
substantial injury or harm to the claimant. '36
In Kinnard v. United Regional Health Care System, a retired physician
was denied privileges to return to practice at a hospital. The committee's
affidavits showed committee members acted without malice. To contro-
vert the affidavits and raise a fact question on the issue of malice, "Dr.
Kinnard was required to present evidence that [defendants] had a specific
intent to cause substantial injury or harm to him."'37
Dr. Kinnard claimed the peer review committee conducted an inade-
quate investigation. Only one member reviewed his application, and that
member never worked with Dr. Kinnard, watched him operate, or talked
to any of his patients. Dr. Kinnard also asserted the committee had ulte-
rior motives, though none were specified.38 But he did not have evidence
that the defendants had a specific intent to cause substantial injury or
harm to him.39 This absence ultimately was fatal to Dr. Kinnard's claim.
"Mere evidence that [defendants] did not conduct an adequate investiga-
tion and had ulterior motives," the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held, "is
not sufficient to establish such an intent. '40
Oddly though, the court of appeals also cited Poliner v. Texas Health
Systems.41 In Poliner, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas denied a hospital's summary judgment motion on a doc-
tor's defamation claim, based on an unfavorable peer review, and held
that evidence of inadequate investigation, coupled with ulterior motives,
was sufficient to raise a fact issue of whether a qualified privilege ex-
isted.42 These seemingly contradictory holdings are difficult to reconcile.
34. See Kinnard v. United Reg'l Health Care Sys., 194 S.W.3d 54, 57 n.7 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (citing numerous cases).
35. Id. at 57.
36. Id. at 57-58 (citing Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 214 n.2
(Tex. 2005) (itself citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(7) (Vernon 2004-05)
"and the revised 'malice' definition, which applies to all actions seeking recovery of
'damages"')).
37. Id. at 58.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 214 n.2).
41. No. 3:00-CV-1007-P, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17162 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2003)
(mem. op.); see id.
42. Poliner, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17162, at *54-55 (citing Duffy v. Leading Edge
Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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B. SUBPOENAS DIRECTED To AN OPPONENT'S CUSTOMERS
Experienced litigants expect to be aggravated over the course of a law-
suit, with its costs, discovery demands, and so on. They also know that if
there is anything worse than having those burdens placed on themselves,
it is having them placed on their customers by way of a third-party sub-
poena for documents, deposition testimony, or both.
Third-party subpoenas directed to customers were at issue in Intel
Corp. v. Intel-Logistics, Inc. 43 There, the defendant whose customers
were subpoenaed brought a counterclaim for business disparagement, not
alleging any particular false statements in the subpoenas themselves, but
alleging instead that filing the lawsuit in the first place and issuing the
subpoenas themselves constituted tortious interference and business dis-
paragement. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas held these statements absolutely privileged and dismissed the
counterclaim, holding that "Texas law allows absolute privilege or immu-
nity for a communication that is related to [a judicial proceeding]. 44
C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A "CROOK," A "THIEF,"
AND A "MISAPPROPRIATOR"
In Fiber Systems International, Inc. v. Roehrs,45 the Fifth Circuit also
considered the nuances of differences which may lie between outright
"thieves," mere "crooks," and, in an interesting footnote, misap-
propriators of intellectual property.46 In the proper case, the distinction
may be significant. As the Fifth Circuit noted, Texas law provides "exten-
sive precedent holding that a false accusation of theft is defamatory per
se," requiring no proof that the statement caused injury in order to be
actionable. 47 Here there was some dispute as to whether the plaintiff
called the counter-claiming defendant a "thief," although no dispute over
the term "crook," in the highly contentious context of two brothers' bat-
tle over ownership of a company and its various confidential materials. 48
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment based on the jury's
verdict of defamation but not without an interesting discussion of how
Texas courts view the terms "crook," "thief," and other names. 49
According to the Fifth Circuit, Texas case law "firmly establishes that
falsely accusing someone of stealing or calling someone a 'thief' consti-
tutes defamation per se."'50 The Fifth Circuit also concluded, however,
that "Texas courts have determined that the term 'crook' does not inher-
43. No. H-05-2255, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34361 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2006).
44. Id. at *3 (citing Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Tex.
1942)).
45. 470 F.3d 1150 (5th Cir. 2006).
46. Id. at 1163, 1163 n.9.
47. Id. at 1162.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1162-64.
50. Id. at 1162 (citations omitted).
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ently have the same defamatory content."'5' In Moore v. Waldrop, the
Waco Court of Appeals held that the phrase "[y]ou don't want to hire
him, he's a crook," was not actionable; it concluded that the word
"crook," standing alone, was merely a term of general disparagement and
not one that imputed a specific crime. 52 In Billington v. Houston Fire &
Casualty Insurance Co., 53 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that
"liar" and "crook" were not defamatory because they were used only as
opprobrious terms. 54 Evidently the Fifth Circuit agreed that calling
someone a "thief" much more directly imputes a crime than merely call-
ing the person a "crook. ' 55 Still, the Fifth Circuit added that calling
someone a "crook" may also constitute defamation per se, if it is used in a
context which imputes theft.56
It would appear that where the accusatory language is less specific, the
context in which the words are spoken takes on even greater importance.
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that, in order to affirm the district
court's judgment, it would be sufficient if "the words used [were] reason-
ably capable of a defamatory meaning. '57 In answering this question,
"the court must construe [each] statement as a whole in light of the sur-
rounding circumstances based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence
would perceive the entire statement. s5 8 The surrounding circumstances
"are the setting in which the allegedly slanderous statement is spoken,
consisting of the context of the statement and the common meaning at-
tached to the statement. '59 Here, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
words used, in light of the surrounding circumstances, did directly impute
specific crimes under Texas law. 60
In an interesting footnote, the Fifth Circuit noted that this left "unad-
dressed whether [a statement] that defendants 'misappropriat[ed] ... in-
tellectual property' constituted defamation. We note, however, that
Texas law defines a thief as, in part, someone who 'unlawfully appropri-
ates property." 61 Though not definitive, the note suggests the Fifth Cir-
cuit might indeed view such a phrase as directly imputing a crime
sufficient to trigger liability for defamation per se.
51. Id. at 1162 (citing Moore v. Waldrop, 166 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005,
no pet.).
52. Id. (citing Moore, 166 S.W.3d at 383-84).
53. 226 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1950, no writ).
54. Fiber Sys. Int'l, 470 F.3d at 1162 (citing Billington, 226 S.W.2d at 496).
55. Id. at 1162.
56. Id. at 1162 (citing Bennett v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 197, 200(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied) ("falsely calling someone a 'crook'" was defama-
tory per se when the defendant called the plaintiff "a 'thief' and a 'crook' who had stolen
... computer software")).
57. Id. at 1163 (citing Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55
(Tex. 1987)).
58. Id. at 1163 (citing Gray v. HEB Food Store No. 4, 941 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied)).
59. Id. (citing Moore, 166 S.W.3d at 386).
60. Id. at 1163.
61. Id. at 1163 n.l (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03 (Vernon 2005)).
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III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. INTENT TO INTERFERE AND "MALICE"
Like nearly all business torts, tortious interference (either with existing
contracts or with prospective contracts) is an "intentional" tort and re-
quires a showing that the actor intended to interfere. What constitutes
the requisite "intent," however, is often elusive.
This issue was explored in Shields v. Delta Lake Irrigation District.62
After a disagreement arose between a land-owning lake district and some
developers who leased some of the land, the lake district began negotia-
tions with a different set of developers. The first developers brought suit
against the district and against some sub-lessees who had intervened.
Claims of tortious interference, both with existing contracts and with pro-
spective contracts, were included.6 3
In describing the elements of a claim for tortious interference with a
prospective contract, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals cited to its own
cases which describe one element of the claim as "an intentional and ma-
licious act by the defendant that prevented the relationship from occur-
ring[... ].,,64 "Intent is established," the court held, "if there is direct
evidence that [the defendants] desired to interfere or if they knew that
the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of
their conduct. '65 This seems straightforward enough until it is considered
that the defendant-actor may have in mind an entirely separate, lawful
purpose of its own-not specifically hoping or even intending that it harm
the plaintiff in the process but knowing full well that harm to the plaintiff
would certainly result. For such cases, the court of appeals also cited
Bradford v. Vento for the contrasting proposition that "if [defendants]
had no desire to interfere with [plaintiff's] action but knew that it would
be a mere incidental result of conduct for another purpose, any interfer-
ence may not be improper. '66
It is not always easy to reconcile the principle that intent is established
when a certain desire or certainty of result is present with the principle
that an interference may not be "improper" when it is a "mere incidental
result of conduct for another purpose," even though the actor knows it
will harm the plaintiff.6 7 Though not expressly stated in this or other
cases, this heavily fact-specific issue often seems to turn, in an undefined
way, on questions of subjective malice. Notice the court's emphasis on
the defendant-actor's "desire" 6 -8-either to bring about the interference
62. No. 13-01-622-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4082 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May
11, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
63. Id. at *1-4.
64. Id. at *46 (citing Larson v. Family Violence & Sexual Assault Prevention Ctr., 64
S.W.3d 506, 517 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied)); Garner v. Corpus Christi
Nat'l Bank, 944 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
65. Id. at *46-47 (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. 2001)).
66. Id. at *47 (citing Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 757).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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or to accomplish some other purpose to which the interference was
merely incidental. With respect to the elements of tortious interference
with prospective contracts, the court of appeals expressly held that the act
must be intentional and "malicious, '69 while acts of tortious interference
with existing contracts must be "wilful and intentional. '70 Here, the
court of appeals held there was no evidence to support that the defend-
ants-actors "acted with the requisite intent and malice for the specific pur-
pose of harming the [intervenors]." '7 1
While the substantive result is probably correct due to the apparent
lack of probative summary judgment evidence produced at the trial level,
it is curious that the court of appeals did not cite the seminal Texas Su-
preme Court case on tortious interference with prospective contract, Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges.72 In Sturges, the supreme court removed
"malice" altogether as an element of the cause of action in favor of a
bright-line rule requiring the defendant-actor's conduct to have been "in-
dependently tortious or wrongful. '73 "Malice" never was an element of
tortious interference with existing contract, at least not explicitly.74 It
may be, however, that the court of appeals' explanation provides a
clearer insight, than perhaps even it expected, into what is really re-
quired-less as a doctrinal matter than as a practical one-in order to
distinguish a true claim for tortious interference from a non-actionable,
"merely incidental result" of a defendant-actor going about its lawful bus-
iness. In this context, recall the famous example of the walrus in Through
the Looking Glass, who protested-as he walked down the beach, picking
up oysters and eating them-that he never meant to harm the oysters.
He only meant to eat them.
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO "INTENT"
IN TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CASES
"Intent" that some result will occur, or a "substantial certainty" that
some result will occur, is difficult to show and can be heavily fact-specific
which may mitigate against deciding such matters on summary judgment.
In Lunn v. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen and Loewy, P.C.,75 however, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas reflected
that summary judgment may be appropriate "even in instances where
such elusive concepts as motive or intent are at issue if the nonmoving
party rests merely on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and/
or unsupported speculation. ' 76 In this case, the nonmoving party offered
"no evidence from which it [could] be inferred that Defendants knew-let
69. Id. at *46.
70. Id. at *47.
71. Id. at *48 (emphasis added).
72. 52 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. 2001).
73. Id. at 726.
74. See Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., 793 S.W.2d 660, 665 (Tex. 1990).
75. No. H-04-404, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11160 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2006).
76. Id. at *28 (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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alone were substantially certain-that [Defendant's] disclosure would
cause [the employer] to terminate [plaintiff's] employment. '77 Conse-
quently the district court granted summary judgment on the tortious in-
terference claim. 78
C. Is "BLACKLISTING" TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE?
AN OPEN QUESTION
In Brim v. Exxon Mobile Pipeline Co.,79 the plaintiffs worked for an
Exxon entity whose crude oil assets were about to be sold to another oil
company. Apparently Exxon and the buyer expected the buyer to hire
many of the Exxon employees who would be affected. Therefore, before
the Exxon employees whose jobs were being "sold" could obtain sever-
ance packages from Exxon, they would have to both apply for, and be
rejected from, jobs with the buyer. Exxon was supposed to give the buyer
a list of employees who worked directly with the crude oil assets being
sold, and the buyer was to confine its hiring offers to persons on that
list.80
The plaintiffs were left off the list, meaning they were neither eligible
for hire by the other oil company, nor eligible for severance packages
from Exxon. Among other claims, they claimed this constituted "black-
listing"8 1 in violation of Section 52.031 of the Texas Labor Code as well as
tortious interference with their prospective relationship with the other oil
company. A person violates Texas Labor Code Sec. 52.031 "if the person
(1) blacklists or causes to be blacklisted an employee; or (2) conspires or
contrives by correspondence or in any other manner to prevent an em-
ployee discharged by a corporation, company, or individual from procur-
ing employment. ' 82 The plaintiffs claimed this "blacklisting" would also
constitute the "independently tortious" conduct, i.e., conduct "that would
violate some other recognized duty," required under Sturges, to support a
claim for tortious interference with prospective relationships. 83
Two federal trial courts-the U.S. Magistrate Judge, and the U.S. Dis-
trict Judge accepting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation-consid-
ered Exxon's arguments that Section 52.031 of the Texas Labor Code
requires that an employee first be discharged as a prerequisite to any
relief and, therefore, does not provide a private right of action anyway.84
Both the claims for tortious interference and for "blacklisting" arose
under Texas law, and in the courts' view raised issues "that have not been
definitely addressed by the Texas courts. '85 Accordingly, and especially
77. Id. at *28-29.
78. Id.
79. No. MO-05-CV-018-XR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27155 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2006).
80. Id. at *3-4.
81. Id. at *5.
82. Id. at *5-6.
83. Id. at *4-6 (citing Sturges, 52 S.W.3d at 713).
84. Id. at *6.
85. Id.
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considering that little additional cost or inconvenience would be involved,
the courts concluded that "the principles of comity and federalism dic-
tate[d] that dismissal without prejudice [was] warranted," so the claims
could readily be brought and decided in Texas state court. 86 Guidance on
that interesting question must await its progress through the state courts.
D. INACTION (FAILURE To RESPOND) NOT TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Sanitec Industries Inc. v. Micro-Waste Corp.,87 the plaintiff com-
plained not only of what the defendant had done, but also what it had
failed to do: namely, respond to numerous inquiries about a certain li-
cense agreement. 88 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's failure to
respond constituted a tortious interference with plaintiff's relationship
with a third party. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas concluded that "such inaction as a matter of law is not
tortious interference. "89 Tortious interference, it concluded, requires "a
willful and intentional act of interference, '" 90 and there was no authority
for the proposition that a failure to act could constitute such a willful and
intentional act, particularly "where, as here, there was no evidence the
defendant had any duty to act." 91 The district court cited several cases
pointing out the need to show an alleged interference as opposed to sit-
ting on ones hands.92 The case might be different if circumstances had
been present indicating the defendant did have a duty to act.
E. CAUSATION IN TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CASES
In Johnson v. Baylor University,93 Vernon Johnson was a pilot for Bay-
lor University. Baylor fired Johnson "for chronic obesity and poor gram-
mar and diction, ' 94 which Baylor felt reflected poorly on its image.
Speech and appearance notwithstanding, Johnson was evidently a good
pilot, at least according to Baylor's then president. When Johnson looked
for a new job with an airline, a background report, prepared by a third
party from information obtained from Baylor, indicated Baylor had fired
Johnson for misconduct, and he was ineligible for rehire. When the air-
line sought copies of Johnson's personnel records directly from Baylor,
Baylor erroneously responded that they were not available. As a result,
86. Id. at *6-7.
87. No. H-04-3066, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36460 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2006).
88. Id. at *18.
89. Id. at *20.
90. Id. at *19 (citing Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Tex. 1996)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at *19-20 (citing Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.
1993) (requires evidence of defendant's "knowing inducement" of breach); John Paul
Mitchell Sys. v. Randalls Food Mkts., 17 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet.
dism'd w.o.j.) (overturning jury verdict where there was no evidence the defendant "per-
suaded anyone" to breach); Davis v. HydPro, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1992, writ denied) (plaintiff must show defendant "took an active part in persuading a
party to a contract to breach it.")).
93. 188 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
94. Id. at 299.
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Johnson was fired from his probationary status with the other airline.
Johnson brought a variety of claims against Baylor, including claims for
tortious interference with his prospective relationship with the airline. 95
The Waco Court of Appeals followed a Dallas Court of Appeals deci-
sion, in turn following a decision of the Texas Supreme Court, that the
tortious conduct must
constitute a cause in fact that prevented the prospective business re-
lationship from coming to fruition in the form of a contractual agree-
ment. The test for cause in fact, or 'but for causation,' is whether the
act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury 'without
which the harm would not have occurred.' 96
In this case, the court of appeals concluded that there was "more than a
scintilla" of evidence that a "cause in fact of [the airline's] dismissal of
Johnson was the misrepresentation and information that [it] received
from Baylor about Johnson's personnel records. There [was] some evi-
dence that Baylor's misrepresentation about Johnson's personnel records
was a substantial factor in [the airline's] dismissal of Johnson. '97 This
evidence was "Johnson's affidavit testimony that [the airline's] decision to
dismiss [him] was based on the records and information that Baylor did,
and did not, furnish" to the airline, combined with applicable provisions
of a federal law requiring that pilot personnel records going back five
years be readily available to prospective employers, and "the undisputed
fact that Baylor misrepresented to [the airline] that Johnson's records
were not readily available." 98 Interestingly, the court of appeals also ad-
dressed the issue of "malice" as an element of tortious interference with
prospective contracts and correctly held that it is not such an element, but
it did so without citing Sturges, instead citing Ash v. Hack Branch Distrib-
uting Co.99
IV. LANHAM ACT SECTION 43(A) AND FALSE
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN
A. PATENT MIS-MARKING ONLY ACTIONABLE UNDER § 43(A)
IF DONE IN BAD FAITH
In DP Wagner Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pro Patch Systems, Inc.,l°° in con-
nection with a motion in limine heard shortly before trial, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas considered
whether patent "mis-marking" of a product (that is, marking a product to
95. Id. at 299-300.
96. Id. at 304 (quoting COC Servs., Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654, 679 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995))).
97. Johnson, 188 S.W.3d at 306.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 307 (citing Ash v. Hack Branch Distrib. Co., 54 S.W.3d 401, 414-15 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied).
100. 434 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
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indicate it is covered by patents that do not apply to it) could constitute
false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and unfair com-
petition under Texas law.101 The plaintiff claimed that this "mis-mark-
ing" could constitute a false representation or description under Section
43(a), and that in turn would constitute a wrongful act sufficient to sup-
port a cause of action for common-law unfair competition. The defen-
dant replied that, since the claim was based entirely on a provision of the
Patent Act relating to proper and improper marking, it was entirely pre-
empted by the Patent Act, and no Lanham Act or state law claim could
lie.102
The district court generally agreed, following the Federal Circuit's
holdings that "federal patent law bars the imposition of liability for pub-
licizing a patent in the marketplace," but noted particularly the important
exception: "unless the plaintiff can show that the patent holder acted in
bad faith. '10 3 Significantly, the district court noted that Hunter Douglas,
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., and two other cases of similar import in-
volved state law claims and Lanham Act claims premised on a patent
holder's demand letters to alleged infringers and their customers, warning
about potential litigation.10 4 Those cases all held that in order to avoid
preemption, bad faith must be alleged and proven, even if bad faith is not
otherwise required under the cause of action. The district court con-
cluded that the same bad faith requirement should apply to both Lanham
Act and state law claims based on mis-marking as it applies to demand
letters and similar communications to customers based on patent
claims.105
Quoting Zenith, the district court explained that, while "'[e]xactly what
constitutes bad faith [is] to be determined on a case by case basis,' where
a 'patentee knows that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not in-
fringed, yet represents to the marketplace that a competitor is infringing
the patent, a clear case of bad faith representation is made out.' 10 6 The
district court warned that if the defendant had, as alleged, "marked its
products with inapplicable patents despite knowing that those patents did
101. The elements of a § 43(a) false advertising claim, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), are:
(1) that the defendant has made a false or misleading statement of fact con-
cerning his product or another's; (2) that the statement actually or tends to
deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; (3) that the statement
is material in that it is likely to influence purchasing decisions; (4) that the
product traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) that there is likelihood of
injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss of goodwill, etc.
Id. at 460 n.2 (citing Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 462
(5th Cir. 2001)).
102. Id. at 458-59.
103. Id. at 460 (quoting Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trail-
ers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
104. Id. at 461 (citing Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1318; Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec,
Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer
Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
105. Id. at 461.
106. Id. at 461 (quoting Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1354).
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not cover the marked products, [s]uch conduct, if true, would be evidence
of bad faith."10 7 In a different case last year, the same court held that to
satisfy the "bad faith" standard in the context of an assertion of patent
infringement, a plaintiff must establish that the patent holder's assertions
of infringement are "objectively baseless," meaning that "no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits."108
B. No HARM, No RECOVERY
Berg v. Symons109 illustrated the familiar principle that if a Section
43(a) plaintiff can only show that a statement is misleading or ambiguous,
he must prove actual deception, either through direct evidence of con-
sumer reactions to the advertisement or evidence of consumer surveys or
consumer-reaction tests. A silversmith's ex-wife wrote to her customers,
introducing her new business. The silversmith complained, contending
the letters created the perception that he had gone out of business. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that
the letters did not constitute false advertising absent a showing that the
silversmith had been injured as a result of the letters. 110
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in
Stewart Family Funeral Home, Ltd. v. Funeral Directors' Life Insurance
Co.11 reached a similar result. A funeral home complained of state-
ments made, by a provider of pre-need funeral contracts, to the effect
that its pre-need funeral contracts were freely transferable to funeral
homes other than those selling the contracts. Injunctive relief was de-
nied, partly because the provider quit making the statements at issue, and
also because an injunction would not have clarified the transferability of
contracts that had already been purchased.112
V. NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
A. Sheshunoff. Texas Supreme Court Clarifies "At The Time"
When the Texas Supreme Court issued Alex Sheshunoff Management
Services, L.P. v. Johnson," 3 it resolved a twelve-year split of authority
among Texas courts over what it would take to show the enforceability of
non-compete covenants in employment agreements.
Since the supreme court's 1994 holding in Light v. Centel Cellular Co.
of Texas, 114 Texas courts and employers had engaged in a raging debate
over when the employer had to disclose confidential information in con-
sideration for an at-will employee's agreement not to compete. The issue
107. Id.
108. Sanitec Indus., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36460, at *18 n.4.
109. 393 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
110. Id. at 560.
111. 410 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
112. Id. at 518.
113. 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).
114. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
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turned on the proper interpretation of one portion of the statute gov-
erning non-competition covenants, which provides, in part, that in order
to be enforceable, the covenant must be "ancillary to or part of an other-
wise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made. '1 15 As the
Austin Court of Appeals required in Sheshunoff, many appellate courts
held that in order for the non-competition covenant to be enforceable,
the employer had to disclose confidential information to the employee at
the same time as the employee signed the covenant, typically at the be-
ginning of employment.1 16 Other courts, and employers, found this inter-
pretation of the "at the time the agreement is made" language in section
15.50 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code impractical. Naturally,
they argued that an employer provides confidential information on an as-
needed basis, and particularly once an employee develops some track re-
cord at the company and establishes his or her trustworthiness with the
company's trade secrets. Because most companies could not rationalize
setting up a transmission of confidential information contemporaneously
with the employee signing the agreement, employers in appellate districts
giving this application to Section 15.50 had few practicable ways of keep-
ing employees from immediately going to work for the competition.
Resolving this issue in Sheshunoff, the supreme court held that "an at-
will employee's non-compete covenant becomes enforceable when the
employer performs the promises it made in exchange for the covenant,"
such that the information need not be provided simultaneously with the
execution of the agreement.117 Rather, like a unilateral promise which
becomes enforceable upon performance, the non-competition covenant
becomes enforceable when the employer fulfills its promise to provide
confidential information.
Under the supreme court's holding, it appears that a non-compete cov-
enant will become enforceable whenever the promise is fulfilled, whether
contemporaneous with the execution of the agreement or several years
later, as long as the employee is still employed by the employer. The
concurring justices to the opinion would have limited how long the em-
ployer could take before fulfilling its promise-that the confidential in-
formation must be provided within a "reasonable" period after execution
of the non-compete agreement, for example, reasoning that when "par-
ties omit an express stipulation as to time," a reasonable time period will
be assumed under contract principles.1 18 The concurrence further
warned that by not imposing a time limit on the employer's performance,
an employer may withhold confidential information unless and until it
suspects the employee will leave his job for the competition. 119
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2007) (emphasis added).
116. Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 124 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part by 209 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. 2006).
117. Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 646 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 661 (Jefferson, J., concurring)
119. Id. at 662 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
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B. "SATISFACTION," AT WILL EMPLOYMENT,
AND ILLUSORY COMMITMENTS
In Pearson v. Visual Innovations Co.,120 Mr. Pearson claimed he was an
at will employee and, as such, any promise made by his former employer
was illusory.121 However, his employment agreement provided that his
employment would continue for six months "subject to termination as set
forth below," and, thereafter, his employer could terminate him if he
"failed to perform to the satisfaction of the [e]mployer in the
[e]mployer's sole discretion.' 22 The Austin Court of Appeals drew this
distinction between an "at will" agreement and one allowing the em-
ployer to terminate the employee if it determined the employee's per-
formance was "unsatisfactory. ' 123 The court of appeals concluded that
his former employer's "promises to provide Pearson confidential and pro-
prietary information, specialized training, and stock ownership were not
illusory because .. . [the employer] was bound to employ [him] for at
least six months unless his performance was unsatisfactory. '124
C. EQUITABLE EXTENSION OF COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE
In RenewData Corp. v. Strickler,12 5 the Austin Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether the district court erred in refusing to extend a non-com-
petition period beyond its original term. The court of appeals concluded
that it was empowered to craft an injunction that would extend beyond
the facial term of the covenant but declined to do so in this case, since, by
requesting certain extensions of time from the trial court, the movant had
been responsible for the delay (as opposed to having delays "inherent to
litigation") 126
VI. COMMON-LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
RTLC AG Products, Inc. v. Treatment Equipment Co. 1 27 confirmed the
familiar principle that unfair competition is a derivative tort, and
"[w]ithout some finding of an independent substantive tort or other ille-
gal conduct, liability cannot be premised on the tort of 'unfair competi-
tion."' 12 8 Interestingly, however, the Dallas Court of Appeals also
asserted that "to prevail on an unfair competition claim, a plaintiff must
establish two elements: (1) the plaintiff's trade name has acquired a sec-
120. No. 03-04-00563-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2795 (Tex. App.-Austin Apr. 6,
2006, pet. denied).
121. Id. at *14.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock & Panther Indus., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 654, 659
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ)).
124. Id. at *18.
125. No. 03-05-00273-CV, 2006 WL 504998 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 3, 2006, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
126. Id. at *5 (citing Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir.
2003)).
127. 195 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
128. Id. at 833.
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ondary meaning through usage; and (2) the similarity of the name used by
the defendant would likely confuse the public. '129 These cases reflect the
traditional view that "unfair competition" refers to "passing off" one's
goods or services as those of another, but, in recent times, the tort has
generally been read to extend beyond common law trademark infringe-
ment and to encompass virtually any actionable business tort. 130 While
the court's statement that unfair competition may be shown in a passing-
off context is certainly correct, it is not the only way in which unfair com-
petition may be shown, and thus the court's statement should not be read
in a limiting fashion.
VII. FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
A. FRAUDULENT STATEMENT MUST BE CLEAR, NOT AMBIGUOUS
In Dardas v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C.,' 31 two groups of
attorneys disputed the proper distribution of attorneys' fees arising from
class-action litigation. As an alternative argument, the plaintiffs argued
that if the Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District deter-
mined that one of the contracts between the two groups covered fewer
than all of the cases in which the plaintiffs were involved, then a genuine
fact issue would exist as to whether the plaintiffs had been defrauded or
suffered a fraud in the inducement. 132
The court of appeals held, however, that it did not interpret the con-
tract that way.' 33 In fact, the court of appeals held that it was ambiguous
whether the contract at issue covered all of such cases. 134 Accordingly,
the "condition" in the "conditional argument" of the plaintiffs did not
occur, and there was no argument properly before the court.135 In an
interesting footnote, the court of appeals added that even if it assumed
that one of the defendants' attorneys had represented that the attorneys'
fees were "truly for the production of the idea," it would "not be reasona-
ble to infer from this remark" the representation the plaintiffs wished to
construe.
36
129. Id. (citing Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, Inc. v. Five D's Publ'g Co., 849
S.W.2d 894, 898 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ); Hudgens v. Goen, 673 S.W.2d 420, 423
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
130. See Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Unfair
competition under Texas law 'is the umbrella for all statutory and nonstatutory causes of
action arising out of business conduct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial or
commercial matters.'") (quoting Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974)).
131. 194 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
132. Id. at 619.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 619 n.6.
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B. "REASONABLE" RELIANCE IN A LITIGATION CONTEXT
It is understood that in order for a plaintiff successfully to bring claims
of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or promissory estoppel, the plain-
tiff must show that she relied on the defendant's statements. 137 It is fur-
ther understood that this reliance must be reasonable and justified.138
What is "reasonable and justified" in particular circumstances, however,
may be more circumspect.
In Ortiz v. Collins,13 9 the defendants purchased a townhome at a trus-
tee's foreclosure sale. Ortiz, however, the previous owner, tenaciously
clung to the townhome despite the foreclosure and a subsequent forcible
detainer judgment, forcing the defendants to file a second forcible de-
tainer action. While it was proceeding, Oritz and the defendants engaged
in certain discussions. Ortiz claimed the defendants said they would sell
the townhome back to him for $10,000 more than they had paid at the
foreclosure sale and would draw up and forward to him a contract to that
effect. The defendants did not prepare such a contract, refused to sign
the one Ortiz prepared, and executed a writ of possession giving Ortiz
twenty-four hours to leave. Ortiz claimed the defendants had defrauded
him, or made negligent misrepresentations, and were bound by the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel. The defendants responded that, as a matter
of law, reliance on any alleged misrepresentations by them could not be
justified in this case because any such representations were made in an
adversarial context. 140
Both the trial court and the Houston Court of Appeals for the Four-
teenth District agreed with the defendant. 14 1 The court of appeals ex-
plained that, "[g]enerally, reliance on representations made in a business
or commercial transaction is not justified when the representation takes
place in an adversarial context, such as litigation.1 142 Ortiz argued that
"the fact that the fraudulent conduct may have occurred in the context of
litigation does not shield one from liability" 14 3 and cited Querner v.
Rindfuss144 and Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd.145 But the majority
viewed those cases as merely confirming that an attorney is not automati-
137. See Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Schleider, 124 S.W.3d 640, 647, 651, 654 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
138. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1997).
139. 203 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
140. Id. at 418-19, 422.
141. Id. at 422.
142. Id. (citing McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991
S.W.2d 787, 794 (Tex. 1999); Chapman Children's Trust v. Porter & Hedges, L.L.P., 32
S.W.3d 429, 443 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Coastal Bank SSB v.
Chase Bank of Tex., N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.)) ("A party to an arm's length transaction must exercise ordinary care and reasonable
diligence for the protection of his own interests, and a failure to do so is not excused by
mere confidence in the honesty and integrity of the other party.").
143. Id. at 422 n.5.
144. 966 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
145. 696 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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cally immune from suit for fraud by a non-client. 146
In an interesting twist, Ortiz argued that the relationship no longer was
adversarial because the parties had reached a settlement-namely, that
the townhome would be sold back to him. The court of appeals followed
McCamish in holding that; "in determining whether a relationship is ad-
versarial, courts should look to the relationship of the parties and the
extent to which their interests are aligned."'1 47 The court of appeals held
that, here, the parties' relationship remained adversarial, so any such reli-
ance was unreasonable. 148
In an interesting concurring opinion by Justice Mirabal (concurring in
the result only), she would have decided it much more simply: the plain-
tiff alleged a settlement agreement, which must be in writing to be en-
forceable, and so it could not be reasonably relied upon by either side.149
In an interesting footnote, Justice Mirabal indicated she also disagreed
with the majority's reliance on McCamish, Coastal Bank, and Chapman.
She drew a distinction between these three cases, which involved what
she described as "evaluative types of misrepresentations," such as state-
ments about the quality of a bank's history, an opinion that certain trusts
were guilty of tortious interference, or statements about past actions in
the process of giving guidance, and cases (such as this one) that involved
alleged agreements by an attorney to act or refrain from acting in the
future. 150 She believed that if the alleged agreements in the present case
had been reduced to writing, the majority would still hold reliance on
them to be unjustifiable because they occurred in the context of litiga-
tion.151 Justice Mirabal did not clarify whether she would have held reli-
ance on them justified if these statements had only been reduced to
writing as required to be enforceable, but it appears she would have so
held, perhaps-but not certainly-inferring that in that event, the parties'
written agreement would have shown their interests to have become
"aligned."
C. DUTY To DISCLOSE IN ARMS-LENGTH TRANSACTIONS
According to the Texas Supreme Court, "[a]s a general rule, a failure to
disclose information does not constitute fraud unless there is a duty to
disclose the information. '152 Such a duty can arise from a formal fiduci-
ary relationship, or where there is a confidential relationship between the
parties, but may also arise in arms-length transactions in at least three
other situations: (1) "when one voluntarily discloses information, he has
146. Ortiz, 203 S.W.3d at 422 n.5.
147. Id. at 422 (citing McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 794).
148. "ld.
149. Id. at 427 (Mirabal, J., concurring) (citing Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454,
459-61 (Tex. 1995)).
150. Id. at 427 n.1 (Mirabal, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Mirabal, J., concurring).
152. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 2001).
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a duty to tell the whole truth;"'1 53 (2) "when one makes a representation,
he has a duty to disclose new information when the new information
makes the earlier representation misleading or untrue;"1 54 and (3) "when
one makes a partial disclosure and conveys a false impression, he has the
duty to speak. '155
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Editorial Caballero, S.A. de C. V., 156 Edi-
torial Caballero, acting under license from Playboy, published a Spanish
language version of Playboy magazine in Mexico. Editorial Caballero
also had the right, with Playboy's approval, to publish a Spanish language
version of Playboy in the United States. But Playboy terminated the li-
cense agreement after about a year. The claims of Editorial Caballero
and its assignee for fraud, based on oral representations that Playboy
would automatically renew the agreement, would not terminate it, would
be "partners," and so forth, were directly contradicted by the express
terms of the agreement and so could not be relied on, as a matter of
law.157
Editorial Caballero complained as much about what Playboy did not
say as what it did. Editorial Caballero complained that while the Playboy
executives with whom it was negotiating were generally positive and en-
couraging about bringing the Spanish language version of Playboy to the
United States, Playboy founder Hugh Hefner was not. In internal memos
and meetings with Playboy executives, Hefner agreed only that the licen-
see might publish an exact duplicate of the U.S. magazine which could
therefore be included in the U.S. magazine's circulation numbers and rate
base. But, with "much of the celebrity pictorial and centerfold content
the same in each issue,"1158 Hefner was gravely concerned that distribut-
ing thousands of copies of a Mexican edition in the United States would
cut into, or "cannibalize," the U.S. magazine's circulation. 159 Though
Hefner was ostensibly no longer in charge of daily operations, he still
owned seventy percent of the stock 160 and was a major presence in the
business.
Playboy's concerns about the cannibalizing issue were conveyed "in
general terms" to the licensees, but it appears that Playboy did not dis-
close Hefner's specific concerns about cannibalizing U.S. sales nor his in-
structions regarding the publication of the Spanish language edition for
U.S. distribution. In these circumstances, the Corpus Christi Court of
153. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 941 S.W.2d
138, 146-47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 960
S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex. 1998).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 202 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
157. Id. at 257-59.
158. Mr. Hefner is known to believe the language of Playboy is nearly universal, but his
comment raises the familiar question of whether anyone reads Playboy for the articles,
whatever the language.
159. Id. at 261-63.
160. Id. at 259.
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Appeals concluded that the evidence did support a duty on Playboy's part
to disclose Hefner's position on these matters because, without it, the
information relayed to the licensees "was not the whole truth, was mis-
leading, or conveyed a false impression." 16 1 The facts that Hefner was
expressing those concerns and obligations openly and vigorously inside
Playboy while the license discussions were going on, and that this was
well known by the Playboy executives involved in those discussions, may
have been determinative. Perhaps the outcome would have been differ-
ent had Hefner not expressed himself so clearly at the time or had the
executives not realized the full extent and significance of his views until
after the deal had already been reached.
The facts in Playboy should be contrasted with those in Clover Staffing,
LLC v. Johnson Controls World Services Inc.162 The plaintiff claimed to
have formed a "misunderstanding" about the existence of a certain re-
bate program because the defendant gave another customer a list of "pre-
ferred providers," some with which the defendant had a rebate
arrangement. The plaintiff claimed that this kind of "partial disclosure"
was confusing and led to a costly "misunderstanding," which the defen-
dant, having disclosed in part, was duty-bound to correct. 163
In Clover Staffing, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas recited the familiar list of circumstances which might
give rise to a duty to disclose, including a "partial disclosure," but it found
no evidence to support an inference that such a duty should be found on
these facts.164 The district court did find that, in fact, there was no rebate
program actually in effect during the relevant period. 165 This finding may
have played a larger role in the decision than the opinion might indicate
on its face. But perhaps the district court's most significant reason was
that the defendant did not make an affirmative statement about the re-
bate program directly to the plaintiff.' 66 The allegedly misleading state-
ment was made to another customer, not to the plaintiff, and this was not
enough to warrant imposition of a duty to correct the "misunderstand-
ing" the plaintiff claimed ensued.167
VIII. CONSPIRACY
Ortiz v. Collins168 and RTLC AG Products, Inc. v. Treatment Equip-
ment Co.169 confirmed the understood principle that conspiracy is not an
independent cause of action but is a derivative tort that requires an un-
161. Id. at 263.
162. No. H-03-1251, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30990 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2006).
163. Id. at *4.
164. Id. at *5.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4-5.
168. 203 S.W.3d 414, 422-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
169. 195 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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derlying tort.170 In both cases, where no underlying tort was found, no
claim of conspiracy could lie either.
IX. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND IMPLIED
TERMS OF GOOD FAITH
A. IMPLY TERMS ONLY WHEN "NECESSARY" TO
CARRY OUT PARTIES' INTENTIONS
Claims that a contracting party is now acting unfairly often sound much
like business tort claims and are often accompanied by familiar business
tort claims, like tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud-
ulent inducement. In Clovis Corp. v. Lubbock National Bank,171 the
plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to read into a written contract an im-
plied term of good faith. This contract appears to have been a factoring
agreement. Under this agreement, the lender would advance to the bor-
rower a percentage of the face amount of the borrower's accounts receiv-
able but would "reserve" a certain amount against the risk of
nonpayment by the underlying customer. The amount of "reserve" was
set according to how the lender judged the risk that the receivable would
not be paid. In this case, the agreement allowed the lender to increase
the "reserve" from time to time, "when deemed necessary by
[lender]." 172 Aggrieved, the lender found it "necessary" to increase the
reserve, and the borrower argued that the contract must be read to in-
clude an implied term obligating the lender not to raise the rate unless it
did so in good faith.173
The Amarillo Court of Appeals noted the Texas Supreme Court's view
that "in 'rare circumstances,. . . a court may imply a covenant in order to
reflect the parties' real intentions. ' "l 74 But the court of appeals also
noted that the Texas Supreme Court had further held that such terms
"'will not be implied simply to make a contract fair, wise, or just."175
Terms will only be implied "'when there is a satisfactory basis in the ex-
press contract[ .... ] which makes it necessary to imply duties and obliga-
tions ... to effect the purposes of the parties in the contract." 176 The
court of appeals spoke in general terms of when a term might or might
not be implied in a contract. The court of appeals could have noted, but
did not, that covenants of good faith and fair dealing have not historically
been implied in contracts governed by Texas law, except in cases involv-
ing special relationships or arising under the Uniform Commercial Code.
In Texas, "[t]here is no general duty of good faith and fair dealing in
170. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996).
171. 194 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.).
172. Id. at 718-19.
173. Id. at 719.
174. Id. (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Renaissance Women's Group, P.A.,
121 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex. 2003)).
175. Id. (quoting Universal Health Servs., 121 S.W.3d at 747-48 (citations omitted)).
176. Id. (quoting Universal Health Servs., 121 S.W.3d at 747-48).
[Vol. 60
Business Torts
ordinary, arms-length commercial transactions. ' 177 In a memorable
phrase, the court of appeals noted that "necessity is the triggering agent"
of when a term might be implied-necessary, that is, in order to effect
what was already the satisfactorily evident intent of the parties. 178
In this case, nothing was said in the contract about acting in good faith.
In fact, the parties had expressly agreed that the lender could raise the
reserve whenever it deemed it "necessary." The word "necessity" thus
arises twice. The holding, basically, is that a term not already found in
the four corners of a document will not be read into it, unless it is "neces-
sary" to do so in order to carry out the intent of the parties which already
appears from their agreement. 179 The facts of this particular case show
that the parties agreed the lender could raise the reserve whenever the
lender felt it "necessary" to do so. Since "necessary"-in the lender's
view-was already the standard agreed upon in this contract for raising
the reserve, it was not "necessary" as a matter of law to imply an addi-
tional term to carry out the parties' intentions.1 80
B. IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, TRUSTING RELATIONSHIPS
MUST ALREADY EXIST
Fiduciary duties may arise as a matter of law from certain formal rela-
tionships or may arise out of informal relationships when "one person
trusts in and relies on another, whether the relation[ship] is a moral, so-
cial, domestic, or purely personal one [ .... ] but not every relationship
involving a high degree of trust and confidence rises to the stature of a
fiduciary relationship."181
Relying on Schlumberger, the 2006 case of Dardas v. Fleming,
Hovenkamp & Grayson, P. C.182 reminds us that "Texas courts do not cre-
ate such a duty lightly.' 83 Here, a dispute arose between two groups of
attorneys over entitlement to attorneys' fees in class-action litigation.
The Houston Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District held that in
order to impose such a duty arising from a relationship in a business
transaction, "the relationship must exist prior to, and apart from, the
agreement made the basis of the suit."'1 84 Here, there was no evidence of
any prior fiduciary relationship between or among the two groups of at-
torneys, so, as a matter of law, the defendants did not owe the plaintiffs a
fiduciary duty. ' 85
177. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41,
52 (Tex. 1998).
178. Clovis Corp., 194 S.W.3d at 719.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997).
182. 194 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
183. Id. at 620.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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X. REMEDIES
A. RETRACTION AND APOLOGY
In Billing Concepts, Inc. v. OCMC, Inc.,186 a federal Magistrate Judge
considered a motion to remand a diversity case removed from state court
on the ground that the amount in controversy fell short of the $75,000
statutory minimum. The federal Magistrate Judge found it was not
"facially apparent" that the value of the injury alleged was likely to ex-
ceed $75,000. In its motion to remand, the plaintiff expressly waived
damages in excess of that amount, so the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas recommended the case be remanded.18 7
The most interesting part of the opinion, however, concerned the recital
of the terms of the ex parte temporary restraining order ("TRO") the
state district judge had entered before the case was removed-and which
perhaps played a significant role in motivating the defendant to try re-
moving the case in the first place.
In this business disparagement and tortious interference case, the de-
fendant allegedly sent out a "single, one-time communication to plain-
tiff's customers. . . improperly characteriz[ing] plaintiff's financial
situation." 188 In an ex parte order, the district court entered what was
likely an order drafted by the plaintiff requiring the defendant, within
three days of receiving the TRO, to provide the plaintiff with (1) a list of
everyone who received a copy of the communication attached as an ex-
hibit to the TRO; (2) a written retraction and apology regarding the com-
munications specified on the exhibit; and (3) a hard copy of all
communications "similar" to what the defendant made. 189 The district
court also enjoined the defendant from further disseminating the contents
of the exhibit, or any false or misleading statement about the plaintiff and
its affiliates.' 90
The district court noted, with a disapproving tone but without further
direct comment, that the order had been sought and obtained on an ex
parte basis, despite the fact that the plaintiff's counsel had contact infor-
mation for the defendant and its counsel, due to pending litigation be-
tween them in federal court in Indiana.1 91 The district court did not
address the substance of the matter further.
186. No. SA-05-CA-1084 FB (NN), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39269 (W.D. Tex. June 8,
2006).
187. Id. at *17-18, *22.
188. Id. at *17.
189. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at *5.
191. Id.
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B. To BE ENFORCEABLE By CONTEMPT, INJUNCTION
MUST NOT BE VAGUE
Houston v. Millenium Insurance Agency, Inc. 192 posed, in an interesting
setting, for the familiar principle that in order to be enforceable by con-
tempt, an injunction must be clear in its terms. The dispute arose when
members of an insurance company had a falling out. Several members,
fearing they were about to be fired, removed certain files from the office,
resigned, and opened their own office. In the litigation that ensued, the
trial court issued a temporary injunction, ordering them to return the dis-
puted files. When all the files were not returned, the trial court signed a
contempt judgment, fined Houston $500, sentenced him to three days in
jail, and ordered him held until certain documents were produced. 93 The
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals promptly granted interim relief and, a
few months later, overturned the contempt judgment, finding: that the
original injunction was "vague in its description of what [the defendant]
was required to produce;" that neither it nor the show-cause motion "de-
scribed the specific documents that [he was] alleged to have failed to re-
turn;" and that the show cause notice neither "advise[d] [Houston] of the
specific acts of contempt [or] ... that criminal confinement and a criminal
penalty would be sought as punishment."' 94
Meanwhile, however-during the few months while the contempt ap-
peal was pending, and before the court of appeals had issued its deci-
sion-the underlying dispute was tried on the merits in the trial court. At
the time of trial, the contempt judgment was not void. The trial court,
therefore, allowed opposing counsel to bring up the contempt judgment
during cross-examination of Houston-including the fact that he had
been sent to jail for it-and to urge in closing arguments that Houston
was so determined to cause the former agency harm that he was willing to
disobey the trial court's orders and go to jail. 195 The final judgment
which ensued was appealed to the First Court of Appeals, rather than the
Fourteenth.19 6
On appeal, the former agency argued that Houston knew perfectly well
what was required of him, as it had been made clear to him orally during
pre-trial hearings, so that his failure to comply with those expectations
was "probative of his malicious intent and should be admissible regard-
less of the ultimate disposition of the [contempt] judgment."'1 97 The court
of appeals disagreed, noting that the possibility that a conviction might be
declared void on appeal, "thereby altering its legal effect and probative
value, is the very reason that [Texas Rule of Evidence] 609(e) prevents its
192. No. 13-03-00235-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 3156 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
193. Id. at *2-3.
194. Id. at *3, *8-9 (quoting In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d 870, 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).
195. Id. at *4, *8.
196. Id. at *4, *8.
197. Id. at *8.
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admission in the first place." 198 Once the conviction was held void, it was
not relevant to any issue in the proceedings, and the court of appeals held
that since the discussion established clearly to the jury that the trial judge
"had already chosen to punish Houston for some of the very actions they
were being asked to evaluate," the error in allowing its admission proba-
bly resulted in an improper judgment. 199 The court of appeals noted that
while "comments on the weight of the evidence can take many forms
[and] admitted evidence should not indicate the opinion of the trial
judge,"200 it was significant that in the context of a jury trial, "'the influ-
ence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great
weight, and [his] lightest word or intimation is received with deference
and may prove controlling."' 20 1
C. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR A TORT
The principle that attorneys' fees are not recoverable for tort claims
(absent statutory authority) is as well known as the saying, "good fences
make good neighbors." Both of these truisms were invoked in Wilen v.
Falkenstein.202 Two neighbors in an upscale subdivision fell into a dispute
over a pair of two matching trees that Falkenstein had planted on either
side of his pool. Wilen complained that one of the trees blocked his bal-
cony view of the subdivision's clubhouse and offered to have his own tree
service cut it back. Falkenstein refused, however, saying he would look
after his own trees. Later, while Falkenstein was away on vacation, Wilen
had his tree service come to cut back his own trees. When the service
asked Wilen which trees needed to be cut back, he pointed to the one by
Falkenstein's pool, and when he was asked how much to trim it, he told
the maintenance serviceman to go up to his balcony and take a look. In
Falkenstein's opinion, the tree was consequently "butchered," looked
"like a table top," and could not be restored. The jury awarded actual
and exemplary damages, plus attorneys' fees. 203
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed all but the attorneys' fees
award, citing the familiar rule that attorneys' fees are not generally recov-
erable in tort actions.20 4 The court of appeals, however, also discussed
two possible exceptions to this rule.
The first exception applies "'where the defendant's tort requires the
plaintiff to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending
an action against a third party,"' in which event the plaintiff may recover
for the "'reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney fees and other ex-
198. Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at *12.
200. Id. at *11 (citing Ex rel. M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Tex. 2003)).
201. Id. at *11 (quoting Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quot-
ing Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894))).
202. 191 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
203. Id. at 795-96.
204. Id. at 804 (citing New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915
(Tex. 1967)).
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penditures thereby suffered or incurred." 20 5 This exception did not ap-
ply in this case because Falkenstein did not sue a third party.20 6
The second exception may permit recovery of attorneys' fees arising
from tort claims where "the defendant 'has acted in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'"207 The Texas Supreme
Court has held that "recovery of attorney's fees for these reasons should
be pursued [as a sanction] under rule of civil procedure 13, not as actual
damages. ' 20 8 Falkenstein did not seek recovery of attorneys' fees as a
sanction, and attorneys' fees were not authorized by statute or contract,
so no recovery for attorney's fees could be had.2 0 9
205. Id. at 805 (quoting Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 15, 33(Tex. App.-Austin 2003), rev'd in part on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2005)).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting Quest, 114 S.W.3d at 33).
208. Id. (citing McCall v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 104 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2003)).
209. Id.
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